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Documented occurrences of character assassination and stigmatization like those 
seen during the COVID-19 outbreak are not unique to the era of COVID-19. In fact, 
these forms of communication are ancient and ubiquitous in human society. Yet they 
have gained the sustained attention of communication scholars only in the past few 
decades. Although stigma communication and character assassination have much in 
common, they largely have been studied separately. Research on how character is 
attacked and why some attacks become social facts has not progressed as quickly as 
needed because these two bodies of scholarship have not shared insights and because 
character as a concept has gone largely uninterrogated. In this essay, we begin the 
process of sharing insights across the two bodies of scholarship. Further, by visiting 
with three ancient conceptions of character, we describe a theory of character 
dynamics: a process of exclusion in which an evolving, agentic character (tropos) 
becomes established (ēthos) and fixed (χarakter) by others, ephemerally and 
sometimes longitudinally.  
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On March 28, 2020, “Chinese virus” was found spray-painted on a jetty on the 
Northwestern University campus in Evanston, Illinois (Mittu, 2020). The next day four 
teenage girls in the Bronx, New York, harassed and attacked an Asian woman with an 
umbrella, saying, “You caused coronavirus, bitch” (Barone, 2020). The next day, near the 
other coast of the United States, an Asian restaurant in Yakima, Washington, was 
vandalized with graffiti that included an ethnic slur and a message that read, “Take the 
corona back” (YakTriNews, 2020). These are three of hundreds of similar reported 
incidents (Anti-Defamation League, 2020). In the wake of the arrival in early 2020 of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, at least one in three American citizens blamed 
China rather than the pathogen itself for the global disaster (Ipsos, 2020; Miller, 2020). 
Misinformation about the origins of the pathogen that causes COVID-19, some of it fueled 
by the U.S. government itself (Sanger, 2020), combined with hegemonic white 
supremacism to cast blame on "Asians, Jews, Muslims and others for the virus" (Allam, 
2020, 0:30). Despite confronting the pandemic with unanimous global scientific 
expertise, the World Health Organization has been subjected to cyberattacks (Gallagher, 
2020), and the head of the WHO, Ethiopian microbiologist Dr. Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus, has received personal attacks, racist abuse, and death threats (Feuer, 
2020).  
This kind of scapegoating, character attacking, and stigmatization is not unique to 
the United States (Kakissis, 2020), nor is it new (Chang, 2020; Samoilenko, 2019a; Smith, 
2007). Indeed, stigma and character assassination have much in common: Both 
incorporate social construction and cause some form of social death. Scholars have made 
use of this overlap, explaining how stigma is invoked sometimes to attack character (e.g., 
Samoilenko, 2020b) and how character assassination can be the means by which stigma 
is socially constructed or enacted interpersonally (e.g., Biernat & Dovidio, 2000; Jones et 
al., 1984). Research on how character is attacked and why some attacks become social 
facts has not progressed as quickly as needed because these two bodies of scholarship 
have not shared insights. The two bodies of scholarship have much to learn from each 
other about how character is attacked and why some attacks diffuse and become social 
facts.  
For us, this reflective activity also revealed the need for a richer understanding of 
character. Although it is the weft thread in the fabric of research on character 
assassination and stigma communication, character has itself remained largely 
uninterrogated in these bodies of work. What is character? What does it mean to discredit 
or kill character? In their book on theory construction, Jaccard and Jacoby (2020) argue 
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that to “clarify, refine, or challenge the conceptualization of a variable/concept” (p. 37) is 
a critical strategy for making a theoretical contribution. By interrogating the concept of 
character, we have a stronger basis from which to understand its relationship to 
communication choices and its outcomes for those who are being characterized. To that 
end, we take as its point of departure three ancient conceptions of character, and 
illuminate the processes through which an evolving, agentic character (tropos) becomes 
established (ēthos) and fixed (χarakter) by others, ephemerally and sometimes 
longitudinally. We begin by considering the intersections of character assassination and 
stigma communication, then we turn to three ancient Greek conceptualizations of 
character. After we delineate synthetic attributes of character, we articulate a theory of 
character dynamics.  
Stigma Communication and Character Assassination  
Goffman (1963), in his famous explication of stigma, argued that when people meet, we 
use available information to categorize each other and impute the other’s character: “a 
characterization… a virtual social identity” (p. 2, emphasis in original). For Goffman, 
stigmas are tied to a specific process of categorization and imputation that “makes him 
[sic] different from others in the category of persons available for him [sic] to be, and of 
a less desirable kind … deeply discrediting … reduced in our minds from a whole and usual 
person to a tainted, discounted one … not quite human” (pp. 4-5). Although he saw 
categorization as part of the human condition, Goffman argued that the categories—their 
boundaries and associated attributes—were socially constructed, with communication 
playing a leading role in the process of creating and enforcing stigmas.  
In a largely separate line of research, character assassination has been defined as 
“a deliberate and sustained effort to damage the reputation or credibility of an individual 
… [which is] selectively applied to social groups, institutions, and corporations” 
(Samoilenko, 2016, p. 115; see also Icks & Shiraev, 2014). Stigma and character 
assassination overlap in fundamental ways: both incorporate social construction of 
character, social response, and profound, long-term damage. As Samoilenko (2016) 
argued, “the process of character attacking may resemble an annihilation of a human life, 
as the damage sustained can last a lifetime" or even endure "for centuries” (p. 115; see also 
Samoilenko, 2020a). Similarly, Goffman claimed that due to stigma “we exercise varieties 
of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce [the 
stigmatized person’s] life chances” (p. 5). 
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Distinctions and Intersections 
Although the two concepts overlap, stigma and character assassination are not the same. 
Stigmas are social facts (Durkheim, 1982) or collective norms (Rimal & Lapinski, 2015): 
they are the simplified, standardized descriptions of the perceived profound disgrace of a 
particular social group and its members that have diffused within a larger community 
(Smith, 2007; Smith, Zhu, & Quesnell, 2016). Stigmas, then, operate at the societal level 
and have their own power to influence people’s beliefs and actions. If people enact 
stigmatization without the stigma in place, then they may be punished by the community 
for dehumanizing others (Thompson & Seibold, 1978). In contrast, if a stigma exists and 
people do not enact it (also referred to as norm enforcement; Phelan, Link, & Dovidio, 
2008), then they may be punished as traitors (Thompson & Seibold, 1978). 
Stigmatization, in contrast, refers to the performance of devaluation (Smith et al., 2016), 
which may include the expression of personal prejudice or the enforcement of (social) 
stigma.  
Character assassination, as a term, has been used to refer to the process by which 
communicative acts destroy another’s credibility or reputation, generally referred to as 
character attacks, and to the outcome of such acts (e.g., damaged credibility; Icks, Shiraev, 
Keohane, & Samoilenko, 2020; Samoilenko, 2020b). The communicative attacks are 
described as deliberate, public (Icks et al., 2020), effortful, attempts to “trigger a public 
reaction … and subsequently undermine the social standing of the subject” (p. 16). Icks 
and Shiraev (2014) categorized forms of character attacks into their scope (individuals or 
groups), timing (during one’s life or postmortem) and momentum (spontaneous or 
premeditated). For example, name-calling involves “a quick, short insult; ridicule; or 
application of specific demonizing labels” (Samoilenko, 2016, p. 116). In contrast, smear 
campaigns are “intentional, premeditated efforts to undermine an individual’s or group’s 
reputation and credibility … consist[ing] of ad hominem attacks in the form of 
unverifiable rumors and distortions, half-truths, or even outright lies … often propagated 
by gossip magazines and websites” (Samoilenko, 2016, p. 117).  
The two lines of scholarship have much to learn from each other. We identified 
three opportunities. First, an immediate intervention for stigma research is to create the 
(missing) typology of stigmatization (Smith et al., 2016). Character assassination research 
has a rich catalog of mechanisms (e.g., Icks et al., 2020), and many mechanisms of 
character assassination (e.g., name-calling) may be heuristic for creating a typology of 
stigmatization. A compelling example is the character assassination strategy of silencing: 
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“the attacker attempts to erase their public record from the collective memory,” often 
post-mortem (Samoilenko, 2016, p. 116; also referred to as erasing; Icks et al., 2020). 
Although it is not labeled as such, there are multiple examples of erasure of stigmatized 
communities, such as nonconsensual de-transitioning of transgender people after death 
(e.g., Whitestone, Giles, & Linz, 2020) and rejection of people who died of AIDS-related 
illnesses from funeral homes altogether (e.g., Wojcik, 2000) so no memorial exists.  
Second, the two lines of research provide competing explanations for why people 
engage in acts of character assassination and stigmatization. One view is that people 
attack others’ character in order to gain access to social or material rewards by reducing 
others’ access or exacting revenge for a perceived injustice (Icks & Shiraev, 2014; Icks et 
al., 2020). Goals for deploying character attacks include “to win political battles, discredit 
unwelcome news, or settle personal scores" (Icks & Shiraev, 2014, p. 3). Stigmatization, 
in contrast, has been considered as (a) value-expressive (Herek, 2000), allowing 
stigmatizers to express their personal stigma beliefs and emotions (Herek, 2000), or as 
(b) communicative, as people attempt to balance the tensions between their personal 
prejudices and normative pressures to act humanely (Thompson & Seibold, 1978). It 
seems reasonable that there are times in which people engage in stigmatization in order 
to exact revenge, or they engage in certain forms of character attacks in order to avoid 
social punishment for acting inhumanely. By considering a range of goals or motives, 
drawn from both areas of research, we may gain greater insight into why and how people 
engage in types of character assassination and/or stigmatization.  
Third, although both stigmas and character attacks gain social force through 
diffusion, only stigma research presents a model for predicting the diffusion process. We 
consider it next.   
Modeling Stigma Communication 
The model of stigma communication (MSC, Smith, 2007; Smith, Zhu, & Fink, 2017) 
emerged as a theory to explain why some expressions of personal prejudice (which could 
present as character attacks) diffuse within a community, becoming social facts 
(Durkheim, 1982) that entomb groups, members and sympathizers, as inhuman without 
access to human rights. Stigma communication, then, is not the performance of an 
existing stigma (i.e., stigmatization), but the messages that (newly) socialize community 
members to recognize and to devalue a group of people. Direct exposure to stigma 
communication leads to cognitions and emotions that, in turn, result in stigma-related 
outcomes, including stigma beliefs, interpersonal stigmatization, and support for policies 
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regulating stigmatized people’s access to community resources and human rights. 
Furthermore, to generate diffusion, the messages need to have qualities that encourage 
people to share them with others.  
  Stigma communication includes four types of content to achieve these messages' 
effects (direct adoption and social transmission): marks, labels, etiology, and peril (Smith, 
2007, 2011; Smith, Zhu, & Fink, 2017). Marks are nonverbal cues that identify members 
of a stigmatized group. To be most potent, marks are visible and gross; these qualities 
allow marks to be recognized quickly and remembered more easily (Smith, 2007, 2011). 
Labels are the terms used to refer to a stigmatized group (e.g., Link & Phelan, 2001). 
Labels, in general, support social categorization: constituting the stigmatized as a distinct 
social group and promoting stereotyping of them. Etiology is the description of people’s 
agency, awareness or opportunity to choose to join or to be associated with members of 
the stigmatized group. For example, etiology content describes the stigmatized person’s 
voluntary decision to violate basic social contracts and engage in taboo activities. Peril is 
the description of the social or physical costs of the stigmatized group to the community. 
Together, the four types of content frame a group of people as fundamentally dangerous: 
as able and likely to harm the rest of the community by their presence and actions (Smith, 
2007, Smith et al., 2017). This person-oriented danger appraisal (Smith et al., 2017) 
includes perceiving the stigmatized people as dangerous and feeling threatened by them, 
which can cascade into feeling disgust, anger and fear toward those who are perceived as 
threatening the community’s wellbeing.  
According to evolutionary psychology, humans developed mechanisms to detect 
threats to physical safety and health in order to survive (Neuberg & DeScioli, 2015). As a 
species, humans faced recurring threats to survival, such as predators, starvation, and 
exposure (e.g., freezing in the cold). Humans are a social species who need to rely on each 
other to survive. At the same time, humans’ greatest threat to survival is sometimes other 
humans. The generalized detection system, then, further evolved to recognize 
environmental (e.g., snakes, rotten food) versus human threats (e.g., cheaters, foes) and 
to mount relevant responses (Cosmides & Tooby, 2015; Neuberg & DeScioli, 2015). One 
difference between the responses is the relation to other humans: befriending everyone 
to manage environmental threats (e.g., to get to safety during a fire or flood; Taylor, 2011), 
or identifying friends to fight foes (e.g., cheater detection; Neuberg & DeScioli, 2015). The 
two overlap: People built coalitions to survive, and stigma functioned to cull human 
threats to effective group functioning (Neuberg & DeScioli, 2015).  
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A primary assumption of the MSC is that communication can set off the threat-
detection system. The theory’s central claim (Smith, 2007; Smith et al., 2017) is that the 
four features of stigma communication activate the person-oriented danger appraisal, 
which, in turn, causes local changes in the recipient’s cognitions (e.g., stigma beliefs) as 
well as behavioral activation to ostracize stigmatized people (e.g., separation of 
stigmatized persons through policy and interpersonal distancing) and to share the meme 
with others. At this point, multiple empirical studies (e.g., Malterud & Anderson, 2016; 
Riles, Behm-Morawitz, Shin, & Funk, 2019; Smith, 2012; Smith et al., 2017; Smith et al., 
2018; Underhill, Ledford, & Adams, 2019; Yang & Parrott, 2018; Zhuang & Bresnahan, 
2012) have revealed compelling evidence for the MSC’s causal logic on a variety of topics 
(obesity, religion, infectious disease, mental health) in classrooms, newspapers, and 
online forums in multiple countries.  
One implication is that we now have guidance on how to avoid creating new 
stigmas when constructing messages about community threats. A different implication is 
that the MSC may explain why some ‘smear campaigns’ facilitate “spread horizontally 
between ordinary people through individual networks” (Samoilenko & Karnysheva, 2020, 
p. 200), and thus, may be more successful in undermining their targets' reputations 
within a community, their support base, and their access to community resources, 
including votes for public office (e.g., swiftboating; Samoilenko, 2016, p. 117).  
Stigma communication and character assassination have many similarities. They 
both include processes of caricature and devaluation in the social sphere. They also 
include processes of diffusion: promoting widespread adoption of the caricature so that it 
has social force. The two bodies of scholarship also have much to learn from each other: 
stigma research can benefit from learning about how character is attacked; character 
assassination research can learn why some attacks diffuse and become social facts. There 
may be reasons to integrate these lines of research: for example, some effective forms of 
smear campaigns may, in fact, be explained by the model of stigma communication. But 
there may be many reasons to keep these communicative acts separate. Character attacks 
(vs. stigmatization) may be a broader form of hurtful messages that manage various 
power dynamics (e.g., maintaining existing power, acquiring new power) between people 
and groups (rivals, enemies, bullies). Stigmatization, in contrast, is specific 
(dehumanization of a group) and predicated on a stigma already in place.   
What is missing from both is a richer understanding of character. Samoilenko 
(2016) noted in passing that "character assassination practices stem back to ancient 
times" (p. 115). Considering a concept in different linguistic systems, cultures, and 
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historical time periods, such as ancient Greco-Roman references, can inspire reinvention. 
Indeed, in their explication of character assassination, Icks et al. (2020) directly mention 
the Greek and Roman references to ēthos, though there is "no single Latin word directly 
corresponding to (the ancient Greek word) ēthos" (May, 2014, p. 5). In addition, the word 
stigma has Greek origins (Smith et al., 2016; Webb, 1883). We returned to ancient 
understandings of character and drew on not only theories from the most canonical—
indeed, hegemonic—ancient figure, Aristotle, but also accounts from two lesser-known 
figures, Isocrates and Theophrastus. Together, these three ancient authors' conceptions 
of character—here considered together for the first time—enable us to articulate a 
dynamics of character. We thus proceed to interrogate three ancient Greek conceptions 
of character—ēthos, tropos, and χarakter—to theorize a dynamics of character in the 
context of stigma communication and character assassination. 
Defining Character 
For reasons good and not so good, scholars and teachers of communication have tended 
to use Aristotelian ēthos as a fundamental concept for understanding character. Reducing 
character to ēthos has too often limited scholars' discussions of character to the bounded 
autonomous subject, to the atom instead of the molecule, to the stationary instead of the 
dynamic. Sometimes, too, the reduction of character to ēthos has resulted in fundamental 
scholarly mistakes, such as in a book with "character" in its title: The book links that 
titular term to a quote from Aristotle's older contemporary Isocrates and goes on to claim 
that the Greek word Isocrates used for "character" is ēthos (Keränen, 2010, pp. 181-82) 
when it is, in that particular case and almost 90 percent of the times Isocrates uses or 
implies words that are translated into English as “character,” not ēthos at all but tropos, 
not dwelling but turning. Building on interpretations of Isocratean tropos as an 
alternative to ēthos for understanding some elements of character (Eberly & Johnson, 
2018), this section of the article provides three ancient conceptions of character—ēthos 
from Aristotle; tropos from Isocrates (a rival of Aristotle's teacher, Plato); and χarakter 
from Theophrastus (Aristotle's successor in the Lyceum and author of the first complete 
work on character in western thought). These three ancient yet approximately 
contemporaneous terms are offered as starting points for a theory of character dynamics. 
 Aristotelian ēthos is by far the best known of the three ancient western conceptions 
of character; thus we begin our discussion of character with Aristotle, born in Stagira ca. 
384 B.C.E. In Aristotle's Rhetoric, ēthos is character constructed in a communicative act 
through good will (eunoia), good sense (phronesis) and good moral character (arete). 
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Ēthos is “an audience’s view of a (rhetor's) moral and ethical dimensions” (Eberly & 
Johnson, 2018, p. 133). Further, ēthos is one of the three main pisteis or means of 
persuasion; pathos and logos are the other two. Rhetors can make strategic choices when 
they attempt persuasion. For a rhetor to display ēthos is to "make his [sic] own character 
look right and put his [sic] hearers … into the right frame of mind" (Roberts, 1954, p. 90). 
That said, Aristotle’s theorization of ēthos suggests “dwelling and consistency” (Eberly & 
Johnson, 2018, p. 132; see also Hyde, 2004): "Aristotle assumes the knowledge of the 
Athenian fore-structure of ēthos as dwelling place and then reinforces the notion of 
dwelling place to present a rhetorical understanding of ēthos" (C. R. Smith, 2004, p. 2). 
Rhetors make choices with the hope of swaying the audience’s initial construction of the 
rhetor’s dwelling place, because the audience is likely to keep that initial impression. 
Informed by Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, ēthos in Aristotle's Rhetoric prescribes a 
stable, ethically sound character in the speaker. This theory of agent-patient relationship 
is also influenced by Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics. Though many of his works and 
ideas were preserved by Islamic scholars Ibn-Sīnā (whose name was Westernized as 
Avicenna) (Gutas, 2016), Ibn Rušd (whose name was Westernized as Averroës) (Pasnau), 
or Jewish commentator Maimonides, elements of Aristotle's thought became influential—
even hegemonic—via centuries of teaching in the Catholic church (Trouve, 1998). 
Significantly, Aristotle saw good birth or "excellence of race" (eugenes) as a key 
contributor to good character (Roberts, 1954, pp. 126-127) and seemed not to consider 
women fully human (Stauffer, 2008). Nonetheless, Aristotle's account of ēthos as 
character has persisted across millennia, continents, languages, and disciplines.  
 Lesser-known figures, however, also have the potential to revolutionize thought 
and scholarship. "We need to reconsider formerly minor figures because they often 
worried over theoretical problems that (major figures) abandoned without solving, but 
that return to haunt us today" (Bizzell, 2003, p. 117). It is to two of these lesser-known 
figures that we now turn. 
 Unlike Aristotle's account of ēthos as dwelling and of character as stable, the word 
that Isocrates (born in Athens in 436 B.C.E.) used when "character" appears in English 
translations of his work is almost never ēthos and almost always tropos. In all of Isocrates' 
works, ēthos—Norlin's translation renders it as "true character"—"is used 6 times and 
tropos 117 times" (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, p. 135). Trop-, the same morpheme at the root 
of entropy and heliotropic, suggests “turning and mutability” (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, 
p. 132), perhaps even dizzying spin (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, p. 132). In short, tropos 
allows that character—and perception of character—can change. The realization that 
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character is mutable helps explain Isocrates' emphasis on public education (paideia) 
across his work; Isocrates, the most influential educator of his day, believed that a state 
was only as good and healthy as the education its students (i.e., male citizens) received. 
Character as tropos also resonates with Fleeson’s (2004) conceptual and Nesselroade and 
Molenaar's (2010) methodological approach to intra-individual variability across the 
lifespan, making suspect the conclusion that humans are substantially “the same person” 
from birth, through life and unto death—and perhaps thereafter (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, 
p. 133).  
 For both Isocrates and modern psychology, there seems to be the potential in 
humans for “intraindividual otherness” (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, p. 134). Isocrates' idea 
of tropos seems to have been informed by the epithet used most often to describe 
Odysseus, the titular character of the ancient Greek epic poem The Odyssey. The Homer-
poet describes Odysseus as polutropos, "of many turns"; but the word is also translated 
as well-traveled, wily, cunning, and even mendacious (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, p. 135). 
Isocratean tropos also allows that individuals may have agency to change personas, to 
"don masks to change character" (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, p. 144). Tropos makes equally 
possible a situation in which an individual's or a culture's character may change in the 
view of a beholder. Isocrates' writings about the Spartans provide an ancient example; 
their character is seen at some times as virtuous and literate and at other times as base 
and ignorant (Hodkinson & Powell, 1994). 
What we are discussing as Theophrastus's conception of χarakter comes from his 
work Xarakteres, the first complete work on character in Western thought. The student 
whom Aristotle chose to succeed him in the Lyceum—the best known student of a 
massively more well-known teacher—Theophrastus (born in Lesbos in 370 B.C.E.) wrote 
about character among many other subjects, ranging from biology and sensation to stones 
and fire. Theophrastus's Xarakteres extended Aristotle's descriptions of types of ēthe, the 
plural of ēthos, in Rhetoric Book 2, Chapter 12-17, where Aristotle discusses "the nature 
of the characters of men according to their emotions, habits, ages, and fortunes" (Roberts, 
1954, p. 121). What Aristotle described, Theophrastus illustrates in language, perhaps for 
the purpose of teaching his own students how to write engaging character sketches and 
even, perhaps, to perform them: these are the kinds of things a character of this type 
would say and do. Theophrastus thereby captured common stereotypes of his time and 
place and culture, 4th-century B.C.E. Greece. Unlike tropos, which suggests turning, but 
similar to ēthos, which suggests dwelling, xarakter suggests a stamp or cast, in wax or 
metal, an entity determined and determinate. 
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To describe the textual history of Theophrastus's Xarakteres as complicated is to 
engage in understatement (Diggle, 2005; Pertsinidis, 2018; Rusten & Cunningham, 
2003). Nonetheless, Xarakteres as we have it, and as it came to us through medieval 
manuscripts, contains three main elements: a table of contents, a preface, and 30 
chapters, each describing a character type living in Athens in the 4th century B.C.E. and 
each characterized by a negative trait. Each character is illustrated by speech and 
behavior. Each of these characters or characterizations is of a middle- to upper-class male 
citizen, some but not all who owned slaves. Each chapter also contains the title of the 
character or behavior; a definition in abstract terms of the quality of the character; an 
illustration of each character, the longest part of each chapter, introduced by "the X man 
is the sort who…" and continuing with a series of infinitives giving characteristic actions; 
and finally, in some cases, an epilogue with moralizing generalizations, probably added 
centuries after Theophrastus' death. 
Some translations of Xarakteres (e.g., Diggle, 2005) keep the grammar of the 
chapter titles in the nominative, as types: The Dissembler, The Toady, The Chatterbox, 
The Country Bumpkin, The Obsequious Man, The Man Who Has Lost All Sense, The 
Talker, The Rumour-Monger, The Shameless Man, The Penny-Pincher, The Repulsive 
Man, The Tactless Man, The Overzealous Man, The Obtuse Man, The Self-Centred Man, 
The Superstitious Man, The Ungrateful Grumbler, The Distrustful Man, The Offensive 
Man, The Disagreeable Man, The Man of Petty Ambition, The Illiberal Man, The Boastful 
Man, The Arrogant Man, The Coward, The Oligarchic Man, The Late Learner, The 
Slanderer, The Friend of Villains, The Shabby Profiteer. The other path is to render the 
Greek of Xarakteres into English as behaviors or descriptions of character as performed 
(e.g., Rusten & Cunningham, 2003): Dissembling, Flattery, Idle Chatter, Boorishness, 
Obsequiousness, Shamelessness, Garrulity, Rumor-Mongering, Sponging, 
Pennypinching, Obnoxiousness, Bad Timing, Overzealousness, Absent-mindedness, 
Grouchiness, Superstition, Griping, Mistrust, Squalor, Bad Taste, Petty Ambition, Lack of 
Generosity, Fraudulence, Arrogance, Cowardice, Authoritarianism, Rejuvenation, 
Slander, Patronage of Scoundrels, Chiseling. Whether nominative or performative, type 
or behavior, Xarakteres covers 9 of Aristotle's 26 vices. "Aristotle provides the seed from 
which Theophrastus's descriptions grow [, though] instead of abstract circumstance (as 
in Aristotle), Theophrastus gives us a real occasion and instead of an anonymous agent, a 
real individual" (Diggles, 2005, p. 7). Whereas Aristotle tells us about kinds of character 
deficiencies, Theophrastus shows us. In any case, with Xarakteres, concludes Diggles 
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(2005), "A new type of work came into existence, owning something to the ethical 
theorizing of the Lyceum and something to the comic stage" (p. 9).  
Finally, as the Oxford English Dictionary (n.d.) points out, the etymon of the 
English word "character," is the “ancient Greek χαρακτήρ [meaning] die, stamp, impress, 
distinctive mark, characteristic, feature,” and “in Hellenistic Greek [χαρακτήρ is] also 
[an] instrument for marking or graving, engraver, letter, symbol, brand, … style” 
(Definition 1, Etymology).  Xarakter thus, along with each individual and distinctive letter 
making up each word as you read it, is also the X that serves as signature—the 
characteristic, determinate mark. 
Attributes of Character  
By looking back to ancient Greek authors, we notice three attributes that vary across types 
of character: flexibility, agency, and centralization. Character can be seen as stationary, 
with the constancy of ēthos and the stamp of χarakter, or as continually turning, with 
tropos. Character as a dwelling or stamp is fixed into place and ultimately inflexible; 
however, as a turning, character is flexible, fluid and ever-changing. This dimension is 
highlighted by Fleeson (2004): “How can we talk about the way a person typically acts if 
that way is always changing?” (p. 83). Ironically, Fleeson (2004), a psychologist, asks that 
question at the beginning of an essay on new developments in psychology to move from a 
debate on whether personality traits or situations best predict behavior (because both do 
imperfectly) to consider (and ultimately quantify) ‘typically’ as patterns of within-person 
change as constant adjustments due to traits and to situations. Personality, then, may be 
best considered as the pattern of turning; it “consists of differences between individuals 
in how they react to situations, rather than in general ways of acting” (p.  84). This turning 
appears in the relatively recent concept of post-traumatic growth: “the experience of 
individuals whose development, at least in some areas, has surpassed what was present 
before the struggle with crises occurred … [it] is not simply a return to baseline … [it] has 
a quality of transformation” (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004, p. 4).  
Regarding agency, character can be seen as afforded to the person by others (i.e., 
being-acted-upon) in ēthos and χarakter, or as a choice made by people as they craft their 
persona for others. Tropos gives the person a voice about their character, but ēthos and 
χarakter give others the power to determine a person’s character. For example, the 
perceiver carves and creates the speaker’s "stamp" (χarakter). Furthermore, tropos can 
be negotiated with multiple roles and audiences; people can change their own persona 
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among settings, scenes, and partners, and over the course of time, instead of there being 
one audience that determines another’s ēthos or χarakter.   
The last attribute is centralization. Character can be construed as centralized 
(ēthos and χarakter) or as decentralized (tropos). For ēthos and χarakter, character is 
centralized in a person or body, becoming unified and essentialized. For tropos, in 
contrast, character exists “without a centralized ‘person’ or body to unify various 
performances” (Eberly & Johnson, 2018, p. 132). This distinction also appears in 
Sampson’s (1985) writings about personhood as a concept in psychology that can be 
defined as an “integrated unity” (p. 1203), or as a “decentralized, multifaceted ensemble 
whose coherence as a being is sustained only by virtue of its continuous becoming” (p. 
1206). Sampson (1985) notes that a unified notion of ego and identity, popular in 
American psychology from the 1950s, characterized unification as a means by which to 
have a sense of self, and identity diffusion as a dangerous condition in which people could 
not settle into, or find order and coherence in daily life. Indeed, Faigley (1989) argues that 
the idea of the self as an autonomous, individual consciousness inheres in the structure 
of the grammars of European languages: "In European languages the fact that I or yo or 
je or ich refers indexically to the speaker of the utterance suggests that the speaker 
possesses an autonomous consciousness and at the same time is aware of that 
consciousness. The unified, individual consciousness coterminous with the physical body 
turns out not to be the 'natural' self but a Western version with specific historical and 
economic origins" (pp. 396-397). In contrast, for non-western concepts of personhood 
and for developments in physics to consider nonequilibrium theory, the “self-contained, 
in-itself integrated (i.e., singular/unitary) entity … describes a dead and fundamentally 
incoherent universe, not one that is alive, evolving, and orderly” (Sampson, 1985, p. 
1206).  
One part of the “decentralized, multifaceted ensemble” (Sampson, 1985, p. 1206) 
is social: “representations of important relationships and roles share the self-space with 
abstract traits, abilities, and preferences” (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, p. 791). This notion of 
an interdependent self, according to Markus & Kitayama (1991), “cannot be properly 
characterized as a bounded whole, for it changes structure with the nature of the 
particular social context” (p. 227). Indeed, an ensemble may confer legitimacy. As 
Samoilenko (2019b) notes, “legitimate social actors are expected to negotiate multiple 
shifting identities in order to manage an array of expectations and obligations in various 
social structures … a legitimate social actor is therefore un homme pluriel, or a plural 
man” (p. 47, emphasis in original).  
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Theorizing a Dynamics of Character  
Interrogating different senses of character invites us to consider character as turning, 
agentic, complex, and decentralized, or as fixed, acted-upon, unified, and essential. 
Indeed, we argue that a central process in stigma communication and character 
assassination is to move from one extreme to the other, resulting in social death. To be 
clear, not every character attack or stigma communication has these intrinsic message 
features; when they do, this work explains why they are so deadly. There are three 
dynamics in which this occurs. We do not order them in sequence: we do not mean to 
imply that any message or sequence of messages moves in a linear order from one 
dynamic to another.  
The first dynamic we consider is attribution: using communication to shift the 
perception of the basis of a moral failing from an act of “a particular moment, behavior, 
or action” (tropos) to an act that represents fundamental flaws (χarakter). Character 
assassination and stigma communication can frame acts not as deviations, but as 
manifestations of the deviant. This dynamic connects to Goffman’s (1967) idea of a 
“stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his [sic] inferiority and account for the danger he 
[sic] represents” (p. 5). The accounting does not locate cause within a moment, or a 
situation, or an external event; instead, it locates cause in the essential nature of the 
stigmatized. Targets do not have the choice to change the “stigma-theory” (Goffman, 
1967, p. 5)—the flaws and ideology are perceived and determined by others, like 
Theophrastus wrote chapters of Xarakteres. Indeed, Phelan (2005) argued that increased 
efforts to attribute stigmatized health conditions to genetics, an effort to reduce blame for 
something out of a person’s control, may create greater problems. If people think of genes 
as the basis of human identity (genetic essentialism), then promoting a genetic basis could 
increase perceptions of fundamental difference, which would exacerbate stigma beliefs 
and stigmatization. Her experiment (Phelan, 2005) showed that participants perceived 
health conditions with genetic attributions (versus environmental) as more serious, 
perceived those living with the health condition as more fundamentally different from 
most people, and believed there to be a greater likelihood that the condition would persist 
in the target, and appear, eventually, in related family members. The consequences of this 
dynamic are profound: acts of the particular inspire communal change (Eberly & 
Johnson, 2018); acts of the fundamental inspire ostracism or culling of the failed (e.g., 
Smith, 2007; Smith & Hughes, 2014). There is no room for learning or rehabilitation; 
there is only removal.  
Journal of Applied Social Theory, Vol. 1, 2021 
148 
The second dynamic we consider is unification: using communication to shift 
character from complex and decentralized (tropos) to simplified and unified (ēthos and 
χarakter). When character assassination and stigma communication frame the target’s 
(person or group) character as coherent and unified around a profound disgrace or taint, 
it makes it essential to who they are. Labeling creates a unified character for targeted 
group, enhancing perceived entitativity of the group. Entitativity is the property that 
makes a collection of individuals into a group—a coherent, intact (Campbell, 1958), 
distinct (Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010), cohesive social unit 
(Campbell, 1958; Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010; Welbourne, 
1999) structured with boundaries and members who share a common fate (Campbell, 
1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Hogg & Reid, 2006). This process, then, stresses that 
the targeted group is an entity that can be differentiated from the rest of society. Together, 
this dynamic creates a fixed, centralized, essential stamp for the target’s character. 
Indeed, it can be carried out to such a degree that the target may be framed as no longer 
human, thus no longer eligible for human rights.  
The third dynamic we consider is fixity: using communication to shift character 
from dynamic (tropos) to stationary (ēthos) to fixed (χarakter). Messages have the 
potential to frame character as no longer evolving, moving, and changing, but as 
stationary (at rest or at equilibrium; ēthos) and, ultimately, fixed and determinate 
(χarakter). Goffman (1963) described the discrepancies between virtual social identity, 
or “the character we impute to the individual” (p. 2), and actual social identity, or “the 
category and attributes he [sic] could in fact be proved to possess” (p. 2). Goffman (1963) 
argued that as people note such discrepancies, they may reclassify or reconsider the 
attributes another person’s virtual social identity. Efforts to manage these discrepancies 
(e.g., avoid discrediting ones) were considered in depth by Goffman. In this third 
dynamic, alteration based on noted discrepancies no longer occurs. The process 
“permanently arrest[s] one’s rhetorical ethos” (Johnson, 2010, p. 463): the caricature 
sustains across time and place, immutable to social relationships, different settings, or 
different stages of a lifespan. For character assassination, this may explain an aspect of 
the most powerful smear campaigns: those campaigns fix character so it is resistant to 
change and counter-campaigns.  The attacks and stigma communication have the 
potential to create a dwelling (ēthos) that, with social force, becomes fixed: a permanent 
tomb for a social death.  
Indeed, the dynamics of attribution, unification, and fixity directly connect to 
stereotyping, which is the common foundation of prejudice, racism, and stigma. 
Journal of Applied Social Theory, Vol. 1, 2021 
149 
Stereotypes are fixed, simplified descriptions of a group and its members (Ashmore & Del 
Boca, 1981). In fact, the history of the word stereotype resonates closely with χarakter. A 
French printer named Didot, in 1798, coined the term stereotype to describe the “use of 
fixed casts of the material to reproduced” (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 1). A century 
later, the term stereotypy emerged in psychiatry circles to refer to fixed, unchanging, 
repeated, persistent behavior, and this rigidity was considered pathological (Ashmore & 
Del Boca, 1981).  
Implications for Character Assassination and Stigma 
Communication 
The dynamics of character, then, present shifts from turning, agentic, complex, and 
decentralized to fixed, acted-upon, unified, and essential. We see three immediate 
implications of this model. First, it advances our understanding of how character 
assassination and stigma communication can (re)constitute character. Icks et al. (2020) 
argue that character assassination “is not harming character per se, but altering the way 
character is perceived and judged by others” (pp. 12-13); this model reveals how 
communication shapes that alteration.  
For character assassination, identifying the types of character attacks that alter 
these facets of character can help to explain silencing. To have character, even the stamp, 
is to exist. When character attacks have navigated all three character dynamics, there may 
be the basis for complete elimination.  
For stigma research, our new model may provide insights into why, despite all the 
efforts to eliminate existing stigmas, a reliable, consistent, effective means to do so has 
not been found. Corrigan and colleagues (e.g., 2012) have conducted multiple meta-
analyses of anti-stigma efforts and categorized the efforts into three types: protest, 
education, and contact. Protest efforts attempt to shame stigmatizers into stopping; they 
are largely ineffective and sometimes produce an unintentional “rebound” (Corrigan et 
al., 2012, p. 964). Indeed, through the lens of power struggles, the attempt to shame may 
result in (counter) character-attacks to destroy the accuser’s credibility and social base 
(Samoilenko, 2020b), an activity that could further bond and embolden stigmatizers 
(Smith, 2007). Education efforts attempt to change mistaken beliefs about stigmatized 
groups with contradictory factual information; they produce small effects. Contact efforts 
attempt to shake up social categories and stereotypes through interpersonal contact; in 
the right conditions, they can produce bigger effects, but they are unstable and short-
lived. Through the dynamics of character, we can see that these efforts to eliminate 
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stigmas take on the stereotype and its legitimacy, but that does not reconstitute character 
as flexible, agentic, complex, and decentralized.  
Third, it may explain why both character attacks (Samoilenko, 2020b) and 
stigmatization can lead to feelings of shame. With all the documentation of character 
attacks and stigmatization through the COVID-19 epidemic, it is not surprising the lived 
experiences of those in COVID wards or with COVID-related symptoms center on shame 
(Daniel et al., 2020; Sahoo et al., 2020). As a person feels “disgraced” (Izard, 1977, p. 386) 
by their failings or shortcomings, they experience shame. Indeed, shame is so tied to self-
perceptions that Izard et al. (2000) argued that “shame cannot emerge until the child has 
developed a sense of self” (p. 24). In fact, some scholars (e.g., Planalp et al., 2000) 
explicitly distinguish shame from guilt based on character: “shame involves being 
whereas guilt involves doing” (p. 4, emphasis original).  
Relatedly, it may help to explain why a stronger sense of meaning in life, self-
acceptance and purpose in life, and stronger identity anchors predicts resisting 
stigmatization (Smith & Bishop, 2019), supports stigma resistance (Firmin et al., 2017), 
and promotes resilience (Buzzanell, 2010). These social and psychological resources likely 
bolster agency of character. A question is whether they can also bolster a decentralized 
and evolving character. A second is whether these resources can also promote resilience 
and resistance to character attacks.  
Conclusions 
In this essay, we have considered the intersections of character assassination and stigma 
communication, and explicated a dynamics of character unfolding in these phenomena. 
Our focus should not be considered an endorsement: we do not endorse the use of 
character assassination or stigma communication, or the dynamic shifts in character 
unfolding within them. We shine light on them in this paper to illuminate them: to see 
them when they are used, and to lead to novel, effective forms of resistance and 
eradication. As Samoilenko (2020a) wrote of studying character assassination, “we must 
understand the disease to know how to counter-act it and fight against it” (p. 278). There 
is much work left to be done.  
Indeed, writing this essay during the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the need to 
advance our scholarship of stigma communication and character assassination. 
Samoilenko’s (2020a) argument that character assassination is becoming “a systemic 
norm” (p. 269) highlights the exigency for scholars to attend to these ancient and 
ubiquitous forms of communication (Samoilenko, 2020a; Smith, 2007; Smith et al., 
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2017). The opportunities for insight by considering the intersections between them and 
unique advances made in each body of scholarship abound. For us, the activity showed us 
the need to theorize a dynamics of character, and we took on the challenge. By visiting 
with three ancient conceptions of character, we described a process of exclusion in which 
an evolving, agentic character (tropos) becomes established (ēthos) and fixed (χarakter) 
by others, ephemerally and sometimes longitudinally. The model inspires many 
questions, some of which we have raised already. We end with these: assuming a turning, 
agentic, complex, and decentralized character provides people their best shot at health 
and well-being, should everyone have a right to that kind of characterization? If it is what 
makes us human and, even more, allows us to flourish, is it a human right? Do we 
understand how to craft messages in ways that allow people to see themselves and others 
in such a light? We ultimately hope that our essay raises many questions for all of us to 
consider, with the hope that by knowing better, we can do better.  
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